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Abstract--In this paper, two password authentication schemes, based on triangle and straight line 
encoding, respectively, are proposed. In our schemes, a one-way function and a strong cryptographic 
operation such as DES (data encryption standard) are adopted. Besides, in each scheme, the system 
only needs to store a secret key pair, and each user can select his own password freely. Instead of 
storing a password verification table inside the computer system, both methods proposed only have 
to store a corresponding table of identities, which is used by the computer system for validating the 
submitted passwords. Owing to these two schemes quickly and efficiently responding to any log-in 
attempt, they are suitable for real-time applications. Furthermore, in each scheme, the system does 
not need to reconstruct any term of the existing key table when a new user is inserted into the system. 
Thus, these two schemes are suitable for practical implementation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the popularity of computer networks and fast progress of computer technologies on 
a multiuser system make the sharing of expensive resources feasible. However, sharing may 
cause some undesired phenomena such as unauthorized accesses and inconsistent status of shared 
resources. Therefore, in a computing environment, the selection of suitable security schemes 
to prevent the information from being disclosed, copied, altered, or destroyed becomes more 
and more important. Among the existing security schemes, using a password is probably the 
most widely adopted authentication strategy in log-in procedure because of its inexpensiveness, 
easy implementation, and user-friendliness. To date, many people have devoted themselves to 
investigating this password authentication scheme [1-8]. In general, the computer system assigns 
each legal user an identity (ID) and each user chooses a password (PW) for later log-in validation. 
The most straightforward authentication approach is to store all users' IDs and PWs in a password 
table as shown in Table i. 
Table I. The password table. 
Password Table 
ID1 PW1 
ID2 PW2 
: 
ID,, PW,~ 
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In order to validate whether the submitted identity ID~ of user i and his associated password 
PW~ is legal or not during the log-in time, the system will search the password table to obtain the 
related password PW~. If PW~ = PWi, then user i is a legal user and is permitted to enter the 
system; otherwise, he is rejected by the system. It is easy to see that the whole scheme depends 
completely on the security of the password table. Thus, some kind of danger is possible in this 
scheme, such as the password authentication system might be destroyed if some information in 
the password table is altered, or an intruder might read the system's password table and forge a 
password to append to the table for later log-in. Thus, if a password authentication scheme is 
adopted, how to ensure the system's ecurity is an important issue. It is believed that we can 
ensure the security of the system if the following conditions are satisfied, even if the password 
table is still in danger. 
(1) The passwords are stored in their transformed forms rather than in their clear text forms 
in the password table. 
(2) An intruder is unable to derive users' passwords, even if he can obtain any information of 
the password table. 
(3) Any change or alternation of the password table cannot help an intruder to enter the 
system. 
In order to avoid the security of the system being destroyed, some known password authenti- 
cation schemes have been proposed [1-7]. A one-way function to encode passwords was proposed 
by Evans et al. [3]. Lennon et al. [6] presented the test pattern scheme to validate passwords. 
Hwang [4] proposed a password authentication method based on public key encryption. A scheme 
based on the concept of the quadratic residue algorithm [9] was developed by Lalh et al. [5]. Later, 
Chang et al. [1,2] proposed two password authentication schemes based on Rabin's public-key 
cryptosystem and DES (data encryption system), respectively. Recently, a password authentica- 
tion scheme based on Newton's interpolation polynomials was proposed by L inet al. [7]. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, some of the existing authentication methods 
are discussed. An effective password authentication scheme based on triangles is proposed in 
Section 3. In Section 4, a much simpler password authentication scheme based on straight lines 
is described. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5. 
2. A REVIEW OF SOME PASSWORD 
AUTHENTICAT ION SYSTEMS 
Using a one-way function to solve the security problem of the password table was first proposed 
by Evans et al. [3]. Intuitively, a one-way function is a function that is easy to apply but hard to 
reverse. Formally, if a function F : A -~ B is a one-way function, it is a one-to-one function and 
implies that 
(1) for every x in A, F(x)  can be computed easily, and 
(2) for every y = F(x)  in B, it is infeasible to compute x. 
Instead of storing the user's password x, the system stores the value y = F(x) .  Thus, the 
password table is replaced by a verification table. This verification table is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The verification table. 
Verification Table 
ID1 F (PWl )  
ID2 F(PW2) 
: 
IDn F(PWn)  
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When user i tries to submit his identity IDi with the password PWi to enter the system for 
logging-in, the system will utilize the identity IDi to search the verification table to obtain the 
relative F(PW~). If the value obtained from the verification table is equal to the value F(PWi) 
computed from the submitted password PWi with the one-way function F, then user i will be 
permitted to enter the system, else he will be rejected by the system. 
However, this scheme cannot protect against an intruder who might alter information stored 
in the verification table. Using the existing one-way function F, an intruder might generate a 
new term F(x) for an arbitrary value x, and then append F(x) in the verification table, or an 
intruder might create another one-way function F / and modify all terms in the verification table 
in terms of Fq Later, the system would always permit the log-in for the forgery password x, 
and the system's ecurity is then destroyed. In order to prevent his problem of illegitimate 
entry, a password authentication scheme which makes use of a special test pattern was proposed 
by Lennon et al. [6]. Derived from the idea of test patterns, Hwang [4] proposed a password 
authentication scheme based on a public key encryption approach. One of the weaknesses in the 
scheme proposed by Hwang is that it needs to store a nonprotected table of the test patterns 
which are generated by the RSA public key encryption/decryption scheme. Besides, owing to 
the computation of the RSA cryptosystem, it is not suitable for conventional computer systems. 
Later, a password authentication scheme based on the concept of public key cryptosystem us- 
ing quadratic residues [9] was proposed by Laih et al. [5]. This scheme still has the following 
disadvantages. 
(1) The verification table is not protected, thus a legal user has the chance to alter the infor- 
mation in the table. 
(2) Owing to the application of modular exponential operations during the initialization time, 
this password generating procedure is very time consuming. 
Recently, a password authentication scheme based on Rabin's public key cryptosystem was 
proposed by Chang et al. [1]. The method is inspired by Rabin's public key cryptosystem [10]. 
One weakness of this scheme is that two distinct users may have the same values in their system 
table. In addition, Chang et al. also proposed a simple password authentication scheme based on 
a conventional cryptosystem DES [11]. 
A scheme based on Newton's interpolation polynomials (NIPs) is proposed by L inet  al. [7]. 
This scheme needs n/2 multiplications and n/2 additions in average to check the validation of a 
password, where n is the number of users in the system. When n is large, this scheme becomes 
impractical. Besides, this scheme needs to store two tables in the memory, which is more than 
other methods. 
In the next two sections, we present wo efficient password authentication schemes based on 
triangles and straight lines encoding, respectively. Owing to these two schemes quickly and 
efficiently responding to any log-in attempt, hey are suitable for real-time applications. Further- 
more, in each scheme, the system does not need to reconstruct any term of the existing key table 
when a new user is inserted into the system. Thus, these two schemes are suitable for practical 
implementation. 
3. A PASSWORD AUTHENTICAT ION SCHEME 
BASED ON TR IANGLES 
In this section, we first introduce the concept of using triangles for encoding the password. 
The main purpose of using triangles is that the area of a triangle is easy to compute. Given three 
distinct points (xl, yl), (x2, y2), (x3, Y3), where xl ¢ x2, in the 2-dimensional plane, without loss 
of generality, assume these three points do not lie on the same straight line. The "signed area" 
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of the triangle constituted by these three points can be computed as follows: 
1 x2 Y2 1 
A = ~ x3 Y3 + x2Y3 + x3Yl  - x2y l  - x3Y2 - xlys). 
Yl 
Let the point (xl,Yl) be kept privately by the system and the point (x2 ,y2)  be stored in a 
Read-Only-Memory (ROM). That is, there is no need to keep (x2, Y2) secret, but any modification 
of this point is not allowed. For a given pair of ID and PW, say ID~ and PWi, we want to obtain 
an encrypted form of PWi. Let F(PWi) be the encrypted form in which F is a secure one-way 
function such as DES, and 
1 x2 y2 
F (PWi )=Ai=~ ID~ hi 
Xl Yl 
1 
----- ~(xlY2 + x2h~ + ID~y~ - x2y~ - IDiy2 - x~hi )  
1 
= ~(h i (x2  - Xl) - yl(x2 - IDi) - y2(IDi - xl)). (3.1) 
Thus, 
hi = (2F(PW~) + y l (x2  - IDi) + y2(IDi - xl)) 
(x2 - x l )  (3.2) 
Furthermore, for avoiding the cooperative attack, we adopt an encryption/decryption strategy 
to encrypt hi based on a conventional cryptosystem--DES. For each key, the system secretly 
generates a corresponding k, as follows: 
k~ = Ex l  (Ev l  (h i ) ) ,  (3.3) 
where Exl and E~I are encryption functions using Xl and Yl as the keys, respectively. For later 
verification, we need to store the k~s in a table, called the key table (see Table 3). 
Table 3. The key table. 
Key Table 
ID k = Ex~ (E w (h)) 
ID1 kl 
ID2 k2 
IDn kn 
In a typical computing system, each user owns an identity (ID,) and a password (PWi) for 
i --- 1, 2 , . . . ,  n, where IDi is assigned by the system and PWi is chosen freely by the user. 
When user i tries to log-in to the system, he first submits his identity IDi and the password 
PWi. The system will utilize the identity ID~ to search the key table for the key value ki. Then a 
decryption operation Dx~ on ki is performed to obtain k~, by using the system's ecret key xl as 
the decryption key. Meanwhile, a decryption operation Dvt is again applied on k~ to generate hi, 
by using the system's other secret key Yl as the decryption key, and then evaluates F(PWi) '  
according to equation (3.1). If the value obtained is equal to F(PWi),  user i is permitted to 
enter the system; otherwise he is rejected by the system. 
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1Dfo~at I No ~._ Reject 
correct ? '~ 
I 
Yes 
ID 1 k I Key ruble 
ID 2 k2 
. . i On -wa, I 
• " !n- ~ ki function F 
IDn-1 1 
ID n kn 
I I 
[ (x2' Y2) I (ROM) ~k'i 
[ 
from throe points ~ 
A i F(PWi ) I 
I A i 9. ) Reject F(PW i 
Accept 
Figure 1. A password authentication scheme based on triangles. 
In our scheme, we can apply any existing cryptosystem, such as DES, to implement the encryp- 
tion/decryption operations. Our authentication scheme is shown in Figure 1, and the following 
example illustrates how this scheme works. 
EXAMPLE 1. Assume that there exists a simple system with four users. Let the pairs (IDi, PWi) 
be (4, English), (3, French), (6, Japanese), and (8, Chinese), respectively. 
(1) Initialization. Without loss of generality, let (xl, yl) = (0, 0) be kept secret by the system 
and point (x2, Y2) = (6, 4) be stored in ROM, and let F be the one-way function adopted by 
the system. Besides, let PW~s be transformed by the one-way function F to -2 ,  18, 24, and 
-16, respectively. After executing the equation (3.2), we can get all h~s, that is, hi = 2, 
h2 = 8, ha = 12, and h4 = 0. Then the system secretly generates a corresponding k~ 
according to equation (3.3). Without loss of generality, let kl = Eo(Eo(hl ) )  = 20, k2 = 
Eo(Eo(h2)) = lS, k3 = Eo(Eo(h3)) = 3, and k4 = Eo(Eo(h4)) = 81. For later verification, 
we store the k~s in a table (see Table 4). 
(2) Authentication. If a user submits his (ID1, PWl) = (4, English) and tries to log-in the 
system, his password is transformed to -2  by the one-way function F at once. After 
searching the Table 4, the key value kl = 20 is found. Then a decryption operation Dx, 
on kl is performed to obtain k~, by using the system's ecret key xl as the decryption key. 
In the same way, a decryption operation Dy 1 is again applied on k~ to generate hi = 2, 
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Table 4. The key table. 
ID k ! 
4 20 
3 18 
6 3 
8 81 
by using the system's other secret key Yl as the decryption key. Furthermore, valuating 
the equation (3.1), we find that A1 = -2  - F(PWl).  Therefore, the user is a legal user 
and is permitted to enter the system. 
(3) Insertion. Assume that a new user with (IDs, PW5) = (2, Latin) is inserted to the system 
and let F(PWs) = 14. A new key h5 = 6 is calculated according to equation (3.2), and 
the system secretly generates a corresponding k5 according to equation (3.3) and then 
appends to the fifth row of the key table without altering the existing key values kis. 
This proposed password authentication scheme has the following advantages: 
(1) In our scheme, an intruder could not forge any message of the key table for later log-in, 
while in the pure one-way function scheme proposed by Evans et al. [3], an intruder might 
generate a new term F(x) for an arbitrary value x, and then append F(x) in the verification 
table. Later, the system would always permit the log-in for the forgery password x, and 
the system's ecurity is then destroyed. 
(2) The user can freely choose his own password, while in the authentication scheme proposed 
by Laih et al. [5], the user has no right to choose his own password. 
(3) A new user can be easily added to the system without reconstructing all terms of the exist- 
ing key table, and the generation of a new key value is simple, while in the authentication 
scheme proposed by Lin et al. [7], it needs O(n) operation time to generate the new value 
of their system table. 
(4) If one user changes his password or a user is deleted, our key table only needs minor 
adjustment or no change, while in the authentication scheme proposed by L inet  al., the 
whole system table (called the s-table) needs to be reconstructed. 
(5) The exposure of the key table does not spoil our system. 
4. A PASSWORD AUTHENTICAT ION SCHEME 
BASED ON STRAIGHT L INES 
In this section, we introduce the concept of using straight lines for encoding passwords. The 
main purpose of using straight lines is that the arithmetic operations needed are simple. Let 
each straight line be described as Li = aixo ÷ a0, in which ai = F(PW~), where F is a secure 
one-way function. Here, Xo and a0 are kept privately by the system. In the same way, for avoiding 
the cooperative attack, we adopt an encryption/decryption strategy to encrypt Li based on a 
conventional cryptosystem--DES. For each key, the system secretly generates a corresponding k~ 
as follows: 
k~ = Exo (Eao (Li)), (4.1) 
where Exo and Eao are encryption functions using xo and a0 as the keys, respectively. For later 
verification, we need to store the k~s in a table, called the key table, see Table 5. 
When user i tries to log-in to the system, he first submits his identity ID~ and the password 
PWi. The system will utilize the identity ID~ to search the key table for the key value k~. 
Then a decryption operation Dxo on k~ is performed to obtain k~, by using the system's ecret 
key xo as the decryption key. Meanwhile, a decryption operation Dao is again applied on k~ to 
generate Li, by using the system's other secret key a0 as the decryption key, and then evaluates 
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Table 5. The key table. 
Key Table 
ID k = E~o(Eao(L)) 
ID1 kl 
ID2 k2 
IDn kn 
ai = (L i  - ao ) /xo .  If the value obtained is equal to F(PWi), user i is permitted to enter the 
system; otherwise he is rejected by the system. Our straight line based authentication scheme is 
shown in Figure 2. 
ID i PW i 
correctlDf°rmat? I No ,..-~'- Reject 
I 
Yes 
ID1 kl  
ID 2 k 2 
I ' One-way • • function F 
, , ~k i  
ID n k n /k' i  
Key table 
ai=t~-a° Ixo  < Li I 
I a F(PW i ) i 
? [ No  Reject a i = F(PWi ) [ ~-- 
Accept 
Figure 2. A password authentication scheme based on straight lines. 
In the following, we describe how the password authentication scheme works through a simple 
example. 
EXAMPLE 2. Assume that there exists a simple system with six users. Let the pairs (IDa, PW~) 
be (3, Waipei), (7, Hawaii), (10, Illinois), (4, Washington), (5, Kentucky), and (2, Texas), 
respectively. 
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(1) Initialization. Without loss of generality, let x0 = 2, a0 = 8, and the PWis be transformed 
by the one-way function F to 12, 1, 7, 15, 8, and 6, respectively. After executing the equa- 
tion L~ = a~xo+ao, we can get all L:s, that is, L1 = 32, L2 = 10, L3 = 22, L4 = 38, L5 = 24, 
and L6 = 20. Then the system secretly generates a corresponding k: according to equa- 
tion (4.1). Without loss of generality, let kl = E2(Es(L1))  = 1, k2 = E2(Es(L2))  = 99, 
k3 = E2(Es(L3))  = 21, k4 -- E2(Es(L4))  = 100, k5 = E2(Es(Ls) )  = 33, and k6 = 
E2(Es(L6))  = 232. For later verification, we store the k~s in a table (see Table 6). 
Table 6. The key table. 
ID k 
3 1 
7 99 
10 21 
4 100 
5 33 
2 232 
(2) Authentication. If a user submits his (IDa, PW4) = (4, Washington) and tries to log-in to 
the system, his password is transformed to 15 by the one-way function F at once. After 
searching the Table 6, the key value k4 = 100 is found. Then a decryption operation Dxo 
on k4 is performed to obtain k~, by using the system's ecret key x0 as the decryption key. 
In the same way, a decryption operation Dao is again applied on k~ to generate L4 = 38, 
by using the system's other secret key a0 as the decryption key. Furthermore, evaluating 
the equation ai = (Li - ao)/xo, we find that a4 = 15 = F(PW4). Therefore, the user is a 
legal user and is permitted to enter the system. 
(3) Insertion. Assume that a new user with (ID7, PWT) = 14, Austin) is inserted to the 
system and let F(PW7) = 26. A new key L7 = 60 is calculated and the system secretly 
generates a corresponding k7 according to equation (4.1) and then it is appended to the 
7 th row of the key table without altering the existing key value kis. 
From the above description, it is believed that this proposed password authentication scheme 
also possesses the same advantages proposed in Section 3. Besides, it does not need to store a 
point in a ROM and the evaluation of Li is simpler. Thus, this scheme is more elegant. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Password authentication is the most straightforward authentication scheme of the information 
security. In this paper, we propose two efficient password authentication schemes based on tri- 
angles and straight line encoding, respectively. The most significant advantage of our proposed 
schemes are "simple." Besides, our schemes do not need to store any password verification table 
in the memory, and the user can freely choose his password, which some past password authen- 
tication schemes lack. Furthermore, no modification of the existing values in the key table is 
needed when a new user is inserted into the system or an old user is deleted from the system, 
which almost all past password authentication schemes require. Therefore, we believe that our 
proposed schemes are easy, simpler, flexible, elegant, and practical for real implementation. 
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